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Tile seemingly irreversible socialist experiment in East-Central
Europe came to a sudden, largely unexpected, end in the late
1980s. That collapse generated impormant  economiiic  and politi-
cal consequences. A broad historical and intertiationalii  perspec-
tive is needed to understand the ongoing transforn;iation  in the
regioni.
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Macroeconomic  Adjustment 
and  Growth 
WPS 677
This  paper  - a product  ol'Ihc  Macrocconom;c  Adjustment  and  Growth  Division,  CouIntry  EconoIm1ics
Dcpartnment - is part ol' a larger cffort  in PRE to analyzc  the transition  from ceniitrl  planninig to a market
econo0l1y in Eastern-Ccntral  Europe.  Copies  arc available  free from the World  Bank,  1818 H Street  NW,
Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact  Emily  Khine  room  NI 1-067, cxtension  39361  (38  pages,  witli
tables).
The papcr  considers  two periods:  beforc  social-  Economic  transformation  in East-Central
ism and  al'ler it.  The lormer  includes  the  1920s,  Europe  probably  will be a long anld complicated
1930s,  and  1940s,  and the  seconl  includes  the  process  because  the  initial  conlditiotns lor the
latc  1980s and carly  1990s.  The  focus  is on  transition  to a malrket ecoinomiiy  are very  weak.
issues  of econoilliC reconstruction,  In fact,  the chief  chalratctei-istics  ol' tilese econio-
hyperinflati  i,  integration  with tihc  global  mics are macroeconomic  imbalances,  obsolete
monetary  system  and  tile lunctioninig  of  thc gold  and  uncompelitive  productive  capacities,  a lack
cxchalnge standard,  thic impact  of thic great  of modem  in frastructure,  underd,eveloped  factor
deprcssion  of  tIlC  1930s and  its afternmath, and  markets,  and  weatk institutions.
postwar  monclary  reforms.  The study  also
compares  per capita  incomiie  and the  structure  of  Nor is the exteiirnal CenviroinimIent  suppoilive.
foreign  trade  of East-Cen1ral  Europe  with thosc  The disintegration  of Coniecon  will entail  large
of  Westen1 Europe  and Latin  America  in the  late  terms  of  tradc losscs  for Eastern  Europe  vis-a-vis
1930s and late  1980s.  the Soviet  Union.  A massive  infllux of western
caipital is unlikely  in tlhc shiomi  to medium  run.
Diff'lercnces in per-capita  incomc  between  International  capital  markets  will bc  reluciant  to
Eastern  and  Western  Europe  widened  af'ter  commit  large amnounis of' cric(it to tilc region
socialism.  In  1937,  beforc  World  War 11  anid  until  rce'orimi  is Ilmore  consolidated.
socialism,  per capila  income  in Great  Britain  -
then  the highest  in Western  Europc  - was 2.6  On the political  sidc, the  initial  euphoria
times  per capita  incomc  in Czeclhoslovakia  - over  the cnd of  the old reginiic is waning  and
then  the  highcst  in East-Central  Europe.  In  people  ar-c  less enthusiastic  about  rceform  because
1988.  the  ratio  of  pcr capita  incomc  in  West  of  the  hardships  accompanying  the  transition.
Germany  - now  witlh highier per capita  income  Fragile  an1ud  changing  political  coalitions  and the
than  Great  Britain  - to that of Czechoslovakia  signs  of somc  surrender  to th[e  temptations  of'
was  5.6.  The  average  inlcomile per  capila  of'  populisimi  clearly  reflect  ihall tendelncy.
Eastern  Europe  hals movcd  closcr  to that of'such
Latin  American  countries  as Argentina,  Brazil,
and Mcxico.
The PRE  Working P'aper  Scrics  diisSeminalcts  tic fndings of work under  way in ihc  Bank's  Policy, Researci.  an(i  Extemal
Aff;airsCotil)lcx.  AnTohjectivc  ofthcccri,s  iCs  loget these  findingsout  quickly,  cven  ifpreseiinations  aIre  Tes thaln  .ully  tlX  )ihedt.
The  findings, interpretations  and conchltions  in tlhcse  papers  do  not  neccslsarily  represent  offieial  Bank policy.
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Current  events  in  Eastern  Europe  are  so far  reaching  in scope  that  a
lor  at the  economic  (and  political)  history  of the  region  seems  as almost
urgent,  if the  current  changes  are  to  be understood  in full  perspective.
Extreme  macroeconomic  instability,  economic  reconstruction  and structural
transformatior.,  the integration  to a global  monotary  system,  the  domestic
consequences  of changes  in international  conditions  are all  phenomena  already
experimented  in East-Central  Europe before  socialism  was established  after
second  wor'id  war.  Thus,  the  study  of the  pre-socialist  period  of Eastern
Europe  may give  valuable  clues  on the  currents  problems  of transition  to a
market (or  capitalist)  system.  A transition  that  constitutes,  in a  sense,  a
rendez-vous of the  region  with its  own  history  (including  also its  problems).
The  paper  is organized  as follows. Section  2 is on the 1920.  and  30s.
It documents  the  formation  of the  national  states  of  what is today (subject  to
some territorial  changes  originated  after  the  second  world  war) East-Central
Europe. Then  we discuss  problems  of  macroeconomic  stabilization  and  issues  of
economic  recovery,  the integration  to the  gold  exchange  standard  and  the
tendencies  towards  protectioaism  developed  in the  second  half  of the 1920s.
Then  we turn  to the 1930s  examining  the  impact  of the  great  depression,  the
collapse  of the gold  exchange  standard,  and the  policy  response  of  most East-
Central  European  economies  to those  events. The  effect  of German  rearmament
on the  economies  of East-Central  Europe  in  the second  half of the 1930s  is
discussed. Further,  we look  at the  levels  of per-capita  income  and  the  main
features  of the economic  structare  of the  region  in  the late  1930s. Section  3
is on the  late 19409. It analyses  the  establishment  of socialism  in the
second  half  of the 1940.  in  East-Central  Europe,  including  the  policies  of
nationalization  and the  creation of central  planning  that laid  the  basis  for
running  the  economy  at (soviet-style)  socialist  lines. From  a  macroeconomic
perspective  we devote  attention  to the  implementation  of  monetary  reforms  in
the 1940.  and discuss  the  origin  and  stabilization  of the  Hungarian
Hyperinflation  of 1945-1946.2
Selc.ion  3 jumps  through  history  the late  1980s  and  early  1909, with the
collapse  of socialism  throughout  East-Central  Europe. There  we state  some  of
the initial  conditions  in the  transition  to the  market  economy  and  provide
some  historical  and international  comparisons  of per  capita  income  of the
region. Finally,  Section  4 of the  paper  offers  concluding  observations.
2.  Economic  History  of East-Central  EurOpe  before  Socialism:  the  Interwar
Period
The end  of the  World  War I led  to the  collapse  of the  four  main
monarchies  that  dominated  East-Central  Europe: the  German,  the  Habsburg,  the
Ottoman  and Czarist  empires. Three  independent  states  were born from  the
former  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy:  Austria,  Czechoslovakia  and  Hungary. The
latter  was  the  most affected  ao it lost  near two  thirds  of the  territory  of
the former  Hungarian  Kingdom. Moreover,  the  kingdoms  of Serbian  and  Croatan
were turned  into  Yugoslavia. Reborn  Poland  (the  new  Polish  Kingdom)  received
territories  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy,  Germany  and  Russia. Some
minor  territorial  changes  took  also  place  in Bulgaria,  and  the  Kingdom  of
Rumania  annexed  territories  from  Hungary  and  Russia'.  As those  countries
suffered  a sizeable destruction of physical capital, infrastructure and losses
in  human  capital  during  the  war of 1914-1918.  a first  priority  afterwards
become  economic  reconstruction.  At individual  country  level,  Poland  was the
most hardly  hit by the  war and  Czechoslovakia  the  one  in a relatively  better
position  after  the  conflict.
'  See  Berend  and  Ranki (1974)  for  a full  analysis  of the  economic  history
of East-Central  Europe  before  (and  after)  world  war I.3
Table  1.  East-  Central  furone  Before  and  After  World  War 1
Area  Poulation
(in  square  Km.)  (millions)
1914  1921  1914  1921
Austro-Hungarian  676.433  51,390
Monarchy
Austria  85.533  6.536
Hungary  92,607  7,600
Czechoslovakia  140,394  13,613
Bulgaria  111,800  103.146  4,753  4.910
Rumania  137.903  304,244  7.516  17.594
Serbia  87,300  4,548
Yugoslavia  248,987  12.017
Poland  388,279  27,184
Source:  Berend  and  Ranki (1974)
2.1  The 1920s
An important  economic  consequence  of the  war  was the  total
disorganization  of public  finances  and the  financial  systems  in  most  he
region. That rapidly  led  to extreme  macroeconomic  instability  and
hyperinflation  notably  in  Austria.  Poland  and  Hungary. The  making  of the
macroeconomic  imbalances  and  high  inflation  of the early  1920s was connected
to the  financing  of the  war and  its  aftermath. Besides  taxation  and  debt
issuing the  financing  of  world  war I  was done,  to a great  extent,  by printing
money.  The impact  of  money  creation  on prices  was (temporarily)  cut  because
the  use  of extensive  price  controls  and  rationing  of consumption  goods
(military  needs  had the  priority  in the  allocation  of resources). Thus,  by
the  end  of the  war the  population  had accumulated  large  involuntary  savings  in
the  form  of liquid  assets. The accumulated  money  overhang  certainly
contributed  to the  outbreak  of inflation. Moreover  public  finances  came  under
strain  as economic  reconstruction  demanded  increased  government  spending  and
fiscal  revenues  were scarce,  mainly  in countries  that  lost  assets  at the4
outset  of the  conflict.
Ma6cteconomic  instability  wes compounded  by soca.o-poi4tical  turbulence.
A  succession  of  short-lived,  ideologically-diverse  governments  ruled  during
1916-1919  in  the  several  countries  of  the  region.  An example  of that  was  the
establishing  of a soviet  republic,  lead  by Bela  Run, in Hungary  in  March  of
1919. In turn,  the socialist  experiment  was followed  by a right-wing
government. The  emergence  of distributive  conflict  was also  evident  t-
workers  sought  a recovery  of real  wages,  which  were very depressed  during  the
war.  However,  the  external  conditions  left  small  room  for  accomnodating  such
demands  for  higher  real  wages  at home,  because  the  reparations  payments  and
the  ensuing  external  transfer  required  an  undervalued  real  exchange  rate.
The war  reparations  payments  sanctioned  in  the  treaties  of  Versailles,
St.  Germain.  and  Trianon,  adverrely  affected  the countries  born from  the
Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  and  also  Bulgaria.  placing  a severe  burden  on their
public  finances  (table  2) and  balance  of payments. As a result  of the  war
reparation  payments  and  large  fiscal  deficits  financed  by printing  money
extreme  inflation  and  massive  exchange  rate  depreciation  developed  in  Austria,
Hungary  and  Poland  (See  Table  3.)2
r  rhe  case  of  Germany's  hyperinflation  will  not  be  discussed  in  this  appear.
For references  in the literature  see  Graham (1930),  Bresciani-Turroni  (1937),
Dornbuech  (1987),  Sargent  (1982),  Solimano  (1990a),  Webb (1989).Table  2:  Fiscal  Budgets  and  Its  Financing  After  World  War I
Percentaae  of
Expenditures  covered






1  Jan. - 30 June 1919  67.0
1  July 1919  - 30 June 1920  63.0
1  July 1920  - 30 June 1921  58.0
1  Jan.  - 31 December  1922  40.0
Source: Sargent  (1982).
Table  3:  Inflation  in  East-Central  Eurove  in  the 1920a
Austria  Hun  arv  Poland  Czechoslovakia
(Price  Index,  (Price  Index,  (Price  Index,  (Price  index
January  1921-100)  July 1921=100)  January  1921.100)  January  1922
100)
1921
December  942  196.4  226.9
1922
December  179409  795.2  1,377.7  59.6
1923
December  21.849  17,000.0  566,055.5  58.8
1924
March  23,336  49,445.24  975,686.8  60.9
April  23,361  50,823.81  963,927.7  60.2
June  24,267  52,566.6
September  53,252.3
Source:  constructed  on the  basis  of Sargent  (1982).
Hyperinflation  in  Austria,  Hungary,  and  Poland  in the  early  19209  shared
some  comon  features: complete  demonetization  and shifts  of the  portfolios  of6
domestic  residents  toward  foreign  currency  and  gold,  dramatic  increases  in the
fiscal  deficits  (partly  endogenously  gener"Ated  by the  reduction  in real  tax
collection  induced  by inflation),  very rapid  depreciation  of the  exchange  rate
and the  complete  destruction  of the  pre-existing  contract-  structure  fot
goods,  labor  and financial  transactions. 3
The stabilization  of those  hyperinflation  episodes  illustrates,  vividly,
the interplay  bLtween  foreign  assistance  and  domestic  f'scal  and  monetary
reform  in stopping  extreme  inflation. In  Austria  and  Hungary,  the
stabilization  was framed  within  a League  oZ Nations  reconstruction  plan (also
signed  by Czechoslovakia)  that  included  two  protocols:  the  first  protocol
established  political  and territorial  sovereignty  of these  countries;  the
second  protocol  set  out a  plan for  economic  stabilization  that  tied  the
granting  of an international  loan  to the  adoption  of fundamental  re'orms  in
the fiscal  and  monetary  areas. Two  key conditions  were incorporated  in the
loan  and  actually  complied  by the  countries. First,  the  institution  of
independent  Central  Banks (that  replaced  the former  Austro-Hungarian  Bank  with
its  two  sections,  the  Austrian  and  the  Hungarian  one).  The  main  proviso  in
the  charters  of the  newly  created  Central  Banks  was the  prohibition  to
discount  treasury  bills,  a practice  that,  when followed  on a  massive  scale,
led  to hyperinflation.  Second,  the  budget  was to be balanced  through  a
combination  of reduced  expenditure  and  increased  taxation.
The  League  of Nations  plan also  reduced  and  clarified  the  amount  and
timing  of the  reparation  payments  owed  to the  reparations  commission;  in
addition,  it lifted  the  lien  on state  assets  imposed  by the  original  treaty.
Those  measures  were undoubtedly  a stabilizing  factor,  as reduced  current  and
expected  fiscal  obligations  abroad'.  Tte  result  in  Austria  and  Hungary  of
3  See  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1986),  Solimano  (1990a),  and  Wicker (1986).
4  The  League  of  Nations  loans  were  not  only  necessary  for  the  reconstruction
of the economies  of the receiving  countries  but also performed  the role of
enhancing  the  functioning  of  the  system  of  international  payments  emerging  after
the  first  world  war.  In  fact,  the  United  States  required  the  allies  --  England,
France,  Italy  --  to honor their  war debts  incurred  with the U.S. However,  to
honor that debts,  the allies  required  the losers  of the  war --  Germany,  the7
the  plan  was  a  stop  of  inflation  and  the  stabilization  of  the  currency  in  1924
(see  Table  3). Poland  managed  to  eliminate  hyperinflation  and  stabilize  the
currency  following  similar  policies  as  Austria  and  Hungary,  namely
stabilizing  the  exchange  rate,  making  the  Central  Bank  independent  and
balancing  the  budget;  however,  unlike  in  the  cases  of  Austria  and  Hungary.  the
stabilization  was achieved  without  a  League  of  Nation's  loan. Later  cG,
nevertheless,  in  1927.  when  instability  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  started
to  develop,  a  large  foreign  loan  was  arranged  with  help  of  the  League  of
Nations.
Czechoslovakia,  formed  in  1918.  was  the  only  country  in  Central  Europe
that  managed  to  avoid  a  period  of  extreme  inflation  in  the  aftermath  of  the
first  world  war; as  shown  in  Table  3,  Czechoslovakia  experienced  deflation
during  1922-23  (matching  that  of  dollar  prices)  following  the  implementation
of  conservative  fiscal  and  monetary  policies.  Economic  reconstruction  went
ahead  without  the  detour  of  passing  first  for  a  period  of  stabilization  as  its
neighbors  did.
The  second  half  of  the  1920s  brought  relative  prosperity  in  East-Central
Europe.  With  the  consolidation  of  stabilization,  output  started  to  grow  until
1929  with  the  onset  of  the  world  depression.  Available  data  on  national
product  for  that  period  shows  that  Czechoslovakia  started  to  grow  since  the
early  19209,  avoiding  the  slump  occurring  in  the  countries  affected  by
hyperinzlation  in  that  period.
countries  formed  from  the  collapse  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  empire,  Bulgaria  -to
transfer  them  resources  in  the  form  of  war  reparations.  After  a  few  years  it
become  evident  that  without  external  support  the  loser  countries  would  be  unable
to  meet  that  obligations.  Thus,  it  is  apparent  that  the  League  of  Nations  loans
involved  just  the  recycling  of  war  reparations  payments.8
Table  4:  Economic  froth,  in  East-Central  EuroRe  i-nthe  Interwar  Period
H4atonlProdust*
(annua  growt rate 2)
Czechoslovakia  Hungaar  Yggaoslyia  Aul&aria
1920  - 1924  4.7  - 3.4
1925  - 1929  3.7  5.4  3.7  2.3
1930  - 1933  - 2.9  - 2.4  -2.1  0.0
1934  - 1939  4.5^  2.5  4.0  7.5
Source:  Elaborate'  on  the  basis  of B. R. Michell  (1975).
* s  For  Czechoslovakia  and  Yugoslavia,  Gross  Domestic  Product. For
Hungary  and  Bulgaria,  Net  National  Product.
a: 1934-1937
The recovery  of growth  in the  second  half  of tho 1920s  was  fueled  by two
external  factors: favorable  agricultural  prices  and  foreign  capital  inflows.
Favorable  agricultural  prices benefitted  not only  the  agrarian  countries  of
the  Balkans.  but also  Hungary  and  Poland. The  major  inflow  of capital,
including  direct  investment,  was coming  from  the  West.  England  and the  United
States  were the  most important  sources  of foreign  capital  at the  time.  Though
the  eeonomies  of East-Central  Europe  maintained  their  trade  with the  rest  of
Europe  and  overseas,  a general  tendency  towards  protectionism  developed  in  the
region  in the  mid-1920s. In  Hungary,  average  tariffs  were raised  from  20
percent,  the  average  level  prevailing  in the  mon&rchy,  to 30 percent  by 1925.
In  Rumania  import-duties  were increased  from  30 percent  before  the  war to a
level  near 4n  percent  by 1924. Bulgaria  raised  tariffs  levels  to prohibitive
levels,  reaching,  in some  activities,  levels  of the  order  of 100-300  percent
higher  than  before  the  war. 5
The  exchange  rate system  rt  ng in the  1920.  in  most countries  of East-
Central  Europe  followed  the "gold  exchange  standard"  system  proposed  in the
'  See  Berend  and  Ranki (1974),  ch. 9.9
Genoa  conference  of 19226. The system  operated  on the  basis  of allowing  the
Cer.tral  Banks (reformed  with the  assistance  of the  League  of Nations  as  we see
before)  to  hold their  r.serves  partly  in the  form  of foreign  exchange  --
instead  of gold  --  against  notes  in circulation  and  sight  deposits. The  U.S.
Dollar  and  the  Sterling  Pound  served  as  reserve  currencies. The system  worked
relatively  weli for a  while in terms  of preventing  the  deflationary  tendencies
that  a "full"  gold  standard  could  have generated  given  the  relative  scarcity
of gold  at that  time.  Nevertheless,  towards  the  late 1920s,  the system  came
into  stress  following  the  events  of France  in 19287.  The response  to the
loss  in confidence  in  the  gold  exchange  standard  in countries  like  Poland,
Czechoslovakia  and  Bulgaria, was the  transfer  of their  reserves  balances  from
London  to Paris  as a run  against  the  pound  developed  Lately,  after  April
1933, the other reserve currency --  the U.S. dollar --  also ceaced to be
eligible  for  reserves  purposes.
6  See  Nurske  (1944)  and  Kindleberger  (1984).
'  Nurake  (1944)  describes  the  situation  in  the  following  terms  :"  The fate
of the gold exchange  standard  was  sealed  when France  decided  in 1928 to take
nothing  but  gold  in  settlement  of the  enormous  surplus  accruing  to her  from  the
repatriation  of  capital  and  from  the  current  balance  of  payments.  The  French  gold
imports  certainly  aggravated  the  pressure  of  deflation  in  the  rest  of the  world
and  specially  in  London.  In  London  the  pressure  become  unbearable  in  the  end,  and
the  gold  parity  of the  Pound  was abandoned".10
Table  5  Exchange  Rates  and  Prices  in the  Interwar  Period  (dollar  cents  per  unit  of local  currency)
Czechoslovakia  aunta  Poland
Exchange  Price  Exchange  Price  Exchange  Price
Rate  Level  Rate  Level  Rate  Level
(crown)  (1929=100)  (Pengo)  (1929=100)  (Zloty)  (1929=100)
1925  2.97  109  0.0017  116  17-74
1926  2.96  103  17.56  102  11.18  91
1927  2.96  106  17.47  109  11.29  103
1928  2.96  lob  17.44  112  11.21  104
1929  2.96  100  17.44  100  11.19  100
1930  2.96  89  17.49  87  11.21  89
1931  2.96  81  17.45  82  11.20  78
1932  2.96  74  17.45  82  11.18  68
1933  3.82  72  22.36  71  14.41  61
1934  4.24  74  29.57  71  18.85  58
1935  4.16  77  29.60  78  18.88  55
1936  4.01  77  19.78  80  18.87  56
1937  3.49  82  19.78  86  18.92  62
1938  3.47  81  19.73  87  18.86  58
1939  3.42  93  19.24  86  18.84  57
Source:  I.  Svennilson  (1954).  *:  The  Pengo  was introduced  in 1925.(lpen=12,500  crcwns).11
Table  5 (cont.)  Exchanze  Rate and  Prices  in the  Interwar  Period
(dollar  cents  per  unit of local  currency)
Yufoslavia  Rumania  Bultaria
Exchange  PricExcxchange  Price  Exchange  Price
Rate  Level  Rate  Level  Rate  Level
(dinar)  (1929=100)  (leu)  (1929=100)  (lev)  (1929.100)
1925  1.70  - 0.48  0.73  95 1926  1.76  101  0.46  0.72  87 1927  1.76  104  0.60  O.J2  88 1928  1.76  107  0.60  0.72  94 1929  1.76  100  0.60  100  0.72  100 1930  1.76  86  0.60  78  0.72  82 1931  1.76  73  0.60  60  0.72  67 1932  1.64  65  0.60  54  0.72  59 1933  1.76  64  0.78  52  1.00  53 1934  2.27  63  1.00  52  1.29  54 1935  2.28  66  0.93  60  1.30  55 1936  2.29  68  0.74  69  1.30  56 1937  2.30  74  0.73  78  1.29  63 1938  2.31  78  0.73  78  1.24  65 1939  - 79  0.71  88  1.21  66
Source:  I. Svennilson  (1954).12
2.2  The 1930a  and  After
The economies  of East-Central  Europe  were not  immune  to the  world
depression  triggered  in 1929. These  countries  suffered  the impact  of a fall
in the  world demand  for  their  exports.  a deterioration  in their  terms  of
trade,  and  a cut-off  of foreign  lending.
Agriculture  exporting  countries  like  Bulgaria.  Rumania  and  Yugoslavia
were heavily  affected  by the  drop in  agricultural  world  prices,  particularly
in  wheat  and  corn (table  6);  a shock  that  had  both adverse  income  and  balance
of payments  effects. The  semi-agrarian,  Hungary  and  Poland  also  suffered
directly  from  the drop  in agricultural  world  prices  and indirectly  from  the
squeeze  in industrial  demand  associated  with the  decline  in real  incomes  in
the r.gricultural  sector. The  more industrialized  Czechoslovakia  (and  Austria)
experienced  a cut in  production  in industry,  in particular  in the  capital-
goods  producing  sectors  during  the great  depression.
Table  6  Price  Index  of Grains.  East-Central  Europe  1930-1933
(1929=100)
Huneary  Yugoslavia  Rumania  Bulgaria
Wheat  Corn  Wheat  Corn  Wheat  Corn  Wheat  Corn
1930  87  59  55  31  63  46  47  51
1931  72  63  57  29  39  34  45  46
1932  77  59  67  29  54  30  34  37
1933  62  32  44  26  63  26  34  25
Source:  Berend  and  Ranki  (1974).
National  product  and  the  price  level  fell  in the  early  1930s,  (see
Tables  4 and  5) particularly  in 1930-33. The  financial  repercussions  of the
crisis  in  real economic  activity  were compounded  by the  bankruptcies  of  German
and  Austrian  banks in 1931. The  attempt  to  keep servicing short-term  credits
from  abroad  entailed  large  losses  in the  holdings  of international  reserves13
and  gold  of the  East-Central  European  countries. In Hungary  major  banks  were
rescued  from  bankruptcy;  in  Yugoslavia,  total  deposits  shrunk  to a half
between  1930-1934  causing  the  bankruptcies  of several  financial  institutions.
In Bulgaria  the  crisis  of the  banking  system  showed  up in the  failure  of the
important  Banque  de Sofia  and  the  merger  of several  other  banks.
In contrast  with other  countries  of the  region,  Czechoslovakia  came
through  the financial  crisis  of the  early  thirties  in  a much  better  shape  than
its  neighbors. To a large  extent,  that  was so because  the  adverse  shocks  of
the early  1930s  caught  her  with a relatively  low  level  of external  debt . As
Table  7 shows,  Czechoslovakia  in the 1930s  had  a level  of external  debt  that
was roughly  a third  of the  debt (as  a share  of national  income)  of the other
countries  in  East-Central  Europe. That  made Czechoslovakia  less  vulnerable  to
increases  in the  foreign  interest  rate and/or  a  cut-off  of foreign  lending.
Table  7  Indicators  of  Foreign  Debt  in East-Central  Europe  in 1930
(dollars)
Hungarv  Czechoslovakia  Yugoslavia  Rumania
Foreign  debt  65.0  34.0  66.0  75.0
per capita
National  income  116.0  171.0  93.0  107.0
per  capita
Foreign debt  56%  19.9%  70.1%  70.1%
as a share  of
national
income
Source:  Berend  and  Ranki (1974).
The  policy  response  to the  depression  of the  1930s  in the  countries
under  study  included  the  imposition  of foreign  exchange  controls  along  with
limited  currency  convertibility;  in  addition,  foreign  trade  started  to be
conducted  under  a system  of administrative  controls  and  approvals. That
changed,  quite  dramatically,  the  relative  freedom  of trade  the 1920s  (though,14
as noted  before,  tariffs  were far  from low  in that  period)  and  reduced  the
degree  of capital  mobility,  the  economies  of East-Central  Europe  enjoyed  under
the  gold exchange  standard  system.
Following  the  example  of Germany.  the  economies  of East-Central  Europe
abstained  initially  from  devaluation,  when facing  the  adverse  external  shocks
of the early  1930s. To counteract  a loss  of external  competitiveness  in  most
of these  countries  a "bonus  system"  came  in operation. The  bonus  consisted  in
a combination  of a subsidy  to exporters  with a tax  to imports  aimed  to
increase  the  relative  price  of traded  goods  (with  respect  to  home goods)  by
means  different  of the  nominal  devaluation8.  Moreover,  in 1933,  additional
imports  duties  were raised  in Czechoslovakia,  Hungary  and  Poland. That
tariffs  barriers  were held  during  the thirties  and  intensified  in second  world
war  when additional  import  controls  were imposed.
The  payment  of external  debt,  both amortization  and  interest  servicing
was suspended  in  Hungary  between  1931-1933. Partial  suspension  of foreign
debt  servicing  took  also  place  in Rumania,  Yugoslavia  and  Bulgaria  even after
the  worst  of the  world depression  had  passed. In contrast,  Czechoslovakia  did
not need  to resort  to the  suspension  of its  foreign  debt  obligations. The
case  of Poland  was somewhat  special  in this  respect. The  government  did  not
adopt  restrictive  policies  during  the  years  of the  depression  and  tried  to
maintain  the  gold standard  parity  of the  zloty  and  paid  amortization  when due;
however,  the  policy  was unsustainable  and,  in 1936.  the  government  had to
reschedule  its  payments  obligations  abroad  and  foreign  exchange  controls  were
imposed.
An important  external  factor  that  shaped  the  developments  in East-
Central  Europe  in the  second  half  of the  thirties  was the  establishment  of a
"war  economy"  in times  of  peace in  Nazi-Germany  in 1933. That system  aimed  to
accelerate  growth  and  required  to secure  agricultural  products  and  raw
materials  to support  Germany's  rearmament. This  was initially  welcomed  by the
s  The bonus system  was administratively  cumbersome  as the size of the
subsidy-tax  varied  across  currency  and  trade  partner.15
countries  of Central  Europe  and  the  Balkans  for  they  were suffering  from  a
depressed  world demand  for  their  products. Moreover  German  trade  policies
after  1933  were conducted  on a  bilateral  basis  priorizing  direct  exchange  of
goods  - barter  trade  --  rather  than  the  use  of international  means  of
payments,  scarce  in  Germany  and in  other  countries  of the region.
Table  8  Composition  of Trade  with Germans  of East-Central  EuroDean
Countries  in  the 1930s
Exports  to Germany  Imports  from  Germany  as
as Percentage  of total  Percentage  of Total
1929  1937  1929  1937
Hungary  11.7  24.1  20.0  26.2
Yugoslavia  8.5  21.7  15.6  32.4
Rumania  27.6  19.2  24.1  28.9
Bulgaria  29.9  43.1  22.2  54.8
Source:  Berend  and  Ranki (1974)
Table  8 shows  that  several  countries  of East  and  Central  Europe
increased  substantially  the  share  of their  trade  conducted  with  Germany  toward
the  second  half  of the  1930s. That  trend  was particularly  noteworthy  in
Hungary,  Yugoslavia  and Bulgaria.
Let  us turn  now to the  level  of  national  income  per  head,  the  structure
of economic  activity  and foreign  trade  toward  the  late 1930s  in the  region.
Table  9 neatly  portrays  the  relative  backwardness  of the  countries  of Eastern
Europe  with respect  to  Western  Europe  in the  19309. Austria  and
Czechoslovakia  were the  countries  with the  highest  per  capita  income  in
Central  Europe,  though  their (average)  income  per head  was around  40  percent
of the  per capita  income  of Great  Britain  (the  most developed  nation  in
Western  Europe  at that  time). In turn,  the  national  per  capita  income  of
Great  Britain  was rLear  six  times  the  national  income  per capita  of Bulgaria
the  poorest  country  in  Eastern  Europe. Moreover,  the  average  income  per16
capita  of East-Central  Europe  was around  onerthird  of the level  of income  per-
capita  of  Western  Europe.
Table  9  National  Income  Per  Capita  in  Europe.  1937
(dollars)
Western  Surolpe














Source:  Economic  Survey  of Europe,  1948.  Geneva.  1949.
With the  exception  of  Czechoslovakia  and  Austria,  most of the  countries
of East-Central  Europe  had a predominantly  agrarian  economic  structure  by the
late 1930s. In the  Balkan  countries  (on  average),  nearly  55 percent  of
national  income  was generated  in  agriculture  (63.32  in Bulgaria). In  Hungary
and  Poland  the share  of national  income  generated  in agriculture  was around  37
percent,  on average,  in 1937. Agriculture  w&s relatively  backward  in  these
countries,  showing  low  productivity  growth,  a structure  of land  tenure  where
tiny  plots  owned  by the  peasant  coexisted  with large  unexploited  farms  owned
by relatively  wealthy landlords;  in addition  surplus  labor  was another  feature17
of the  low level  of agricultural  development  in the  area.
The  share  of manufacturing  in income  was 53 percent  in Czechoslovakia,
near 34 percent  in Hungary  and  Poland,  and around  23 percent  in  Yugoslavia,
Rumania  and  Bulgaria. In Czechoslovakia,  the  industrial  sector concentrated
in the  capital-goods  producing  sector,  chemicals  and  other  "heavy"  branches.
In contrast,  in the  less  industrialized  countries  of the  region the
manufacturing  sector  focused  in  the  processing  of food,  textiles  and  other
"light"  activities.
Table 10  Structure  of National  Income  by Economic  Sectors  of Selected
East-Central  European  Countries.  1938
(percentages)
Agriculture  Industrv  Construction  Total
and Services
Czechoslovakia  23.2  53.2  23.6  100.0
Hungary  36.5  35.7  27.8  100.0
Poland  39.0  32.2  28.8  100.0
Rumania  53.2  28.4  18.4  100.0
Yugoslavia  53.6  22.1  24.3  100.0
Bulgaria  63.3  18.3  18.4  100.0
Source:  Berend  and  Ranki (1974)
Their  structure  of foreign  trade  reflected  their  pattern  of development
and  specialization.  In  most of these  countries  the  bulk of their  exports  were
composed  by raw  materials  and  food,  whereas  their  imports  concentrated,
mainly,  in  manufacturing  goods  and intermediate  inputs. In contrast,
Czechoslovakia  was a  net exporter  of  manufacturing  goods  and a  net importer  of
raw  materials  and  food.18
Table 11  Structure  of ForeiRn  Trade  in  East-Ce.ntral  Europe.  1938
(percentages)
Exports
Czechoslovakia Hungarv  Poland Yugoslavia Rumania Bulgaria
Manufactured  71.8  13.0  6.4  0.8  1.9  2.0
goods
Raw  materials  19.8  31.7  65.1  49.5  64.3  66.6
and  intermediate
goods
Foodstuffs  8.4  55.3  28.5  49.7  33.8  31.4
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Imports
Manufactured  29.6  30.2  28.4  44.8  68.3  68.0
goods
Raw  materials  57.5  61.5  54.1  50.1  27.3  31.5
and intermediate
goods
Foodstuffs  12.9  8.3  17.5  5.1  4.5  0.5
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  N. Spulber  (1957).
As we mentioned  before  the  economy  (and  the  politics)  of East-Central
Europe  was directly  affected  by the  German  drive  toward  the  war.  Here  a
distinction  should  be  made among  the  group  of countries  that  were (at  least)
partly  annexed  in 1938-39,  namely  Czechoslovakia  and  Austria  or the  so-called
"Czech-Moravian  Protectorate",  the  "satellites"  countries3 Hungary,  Rumania
and  Bulgaria  and  the  group  of countries  that  were occupied  and  physically
devastated:  Poland  and  Yugoslavia. The  members  of the  "Czech-Moravian
Protectorate",  given  its  relatively  advanced  stage  of industrialization  and
financial  development  were integrated  into  the  German  economy  under  a  system
of centralized  state  control,  typical  of  a  war economy. Moreover,  the
intervention  of the "protectorate"  entailed  some  confiscation  of property19
including  industry  and  bank assets.
In Hungary.  Rumania  and Bulgaria,  the  war economy  did  not involve  open
occupation  though  German  control  was effective. These  countries  supplied
food,  agricultural  products  in general  and  raw  materials  like  iron,  bauxite,
and timber  to  Germany. The intervention  had  also  some  important  macroeconomic
consequences  as Germany  accumulated  debts  with these  countries  for  unpaid
supplies. To compensate  domestic  producers  for  those  unpaid  orders  the
national  governments  started  to print  bank notes. Thus,  following  unpaid
German  deliveries,  a "money  overhang"  developed. In turn  the inflationary
impact  of excessive  liquidity  was repressed  by rationing  of goods. On the
supply  side a system  of compulsory  deliveries  of fix  quotas  of agricultural
goods  and  raw  materials  to the state  was enacted  and  severely  enforced.
The  third  group  comprised  by Poland  and  Yugoslavia  was the  hardest  t.tt
during  the  war.  Both  countries  lost  their  national  independence  and  their
territories  were split  and  occupied  by Germany,  Italy,  and  the  Soviet  Union.
In addition  parts  of  Yugoslavia  were annexed  to  Hungary  and  Bulgaria. The
initial  strategy  of the  axis-countries  against  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  was
outright  destruction  entailing  annihilation  of communication,  and  destruction
of ph7sical  infrastructure  and industrial  capacities. However,  that  policy
was shifted  afterwards  and  priority  was given  to secure  deliveries  of food  and
raw  materials  to Germany  as its  involvement  in  the  war required  enhanced
supply  of those  goods. By the  end  of  world  war II  most of the  countries  of
East-Central  Europe  suffered  enormous  losses. Poland  and  Yugoslavia  lost  an
important  part of their  population,  their  railway  system  was severely  damaged
as  well as roads  and infrastructure  and  communications  in general. In
addition  the  capital  stock  in industry  and  agriculture  was partly  destroyed
with the obvious  adverse  effect  on productive  capacities. 9
9  The  estimates  of  the  destructions  are  imprecise  though  some  numbers  exist:
Yugoslavia  lost  10  per  cent  of  her  population  and  half  of the  industrial  engines
and around 40 to 50 percent of agricultural  machines and equipment  were
destroyed.  In Poland,  40 per cent of railways  were destroyed,  85 percent  of
housing in Warsaw were devastated  besides  huge destruction  in industry  and
agriculture.  See Berend  and  Ranki  (1974),  ch. 13.20
2.3  The Establishment  of Socialism  in the  'econd  Half  of the 1940s
The end  of second  world  war brought  far-reaching  political  and  economic
changes  to  East-Central  Europe. A redistribution  of territories  in Poland,
Czechoslovakia,  Rumania  and Bulgaria  took  place'°.  The  Soviet  Union  gained
territories  at the  expense  of these  countries  and  Poland  was retributed  with
territories  of Germany. As it could  be expected,  all these  changes  altered
the  resource  availability  in terms  of agricultural  land,  natural  resources  and
industrial  capital  stock  in  the  area.  The  major  changes  took  place  in Poland
and  Czechoslovakia  as the  changes  in their  national  boundaries  were of a  more
sweeping  nature. In addition  the  Soviet  Union  required  in the  peace  treaties
the  deposition  of German  assets  in the former  satellites  countries  of Germany
(Hungary,  Rumania,  and  Bulgaria). At the  political  level,  the  governments
emerging  after  the  second  world  war  were formed  by broad  political  coalitions
running  from  liberals  to communists. The  dynamics  of the  political  situation
was such  that  the  communist  parties  managed  to acquire,  in  various  cases
through  coup  d'etat,  dominant  positions  in government  and  the state  after
1948. Following  the  new  political  setting,  the  economies  of Eastern  Europe
were reorganized  along  the  lines  of the  Soviet  economic  system. The first  and
most important  move  was the  nationalization  of industry,  the  financial  system,
the  trade  and services  sectors  along  with a process  of agrarian  reform,  the
latter  being  an old  aspiration  of the  political  left  and the  peasantry.
In Czechoslovakia,  before  the  communist  coup  d'etat  of February  of 1948
the  nationalization  laws  brought  into  the  state  sector  near 57 percent  of
total  industrial  labor  force. After 1948  that  process  accelerated  and  by 1949
just  3 percent  of total  employment  in  manufacturing  was generated  in the
private  sector. In Poland  the  state  sector  accounted  for  near 85 percent  of
total  employment  in the  manufacturing  sector  for  units  with over  5 workers  in
1946;  moreover,  the  tendency  to full  nationalization  of industry  was almost
complete  by the  early  1950s. In  Hungary,  after  a relatively  moderate  start  in
'°  Hungary  was the only country  that returned  to its  pre-war  territorial
status  (see  Spulber  1954).21
terms  of  nationalization,  the  process  was  intensified  since  1948  with the
deepening  of nationalization  of  medium  and  large  scale  fivms  in  manufacturing.
With some  specific  differences  the  same  process  also took  place  in Rumania  and
Bulgaria.
By 1949  the  share  of the  socialized  sector  in  gross  manwfacturing  output
ranged  from  85  percent  in  Rumania  to 92  percent  in Hungary,  93  percent  in
Bulgaria.  94 percent  in  Czechoslovakia  and 100  percent  in  Yugoslavia."
Thus,  the  private  sector  practically  disappeared  from  the  productive  sphere  in
a period  of around  five  years.
The  nationalization  laws  contemplated  the  compensation  of former  owners
of the  enterprises" 2 through  treasury  bills,  money  payments  or paper  issued
by newly  created  funds. The  extent  of compensations  actually  carried-out  is
hard  to determine,  though  there  is  a  widespread  presumption  that  they  were
ultimately  very low.  Besides,  the  nationalization  process  spurred  the  merging
and  consolidation  of nationalized  enterprises  thereby  creating  monopolistic
market  structures. Moreover  a few  units  ended-up  producing  the  total  supply
of given  goods. Also  nationalization  encouraged  vertical  integration  and
required  centralized  decision  making. Therefore  central  planning  and  full
state-ownership  become  closely  intertwined.
The  nationalization  of the  banking  and  financial  systems  was facilitated
in Czechoslovakia,  Poland,  and  Yugoslavia  because  there  was no private
property  of  major financial  institutions  after  the  war.  In general  a  process
of  merging  and  centralization  in "State  National  Banks"  took  place  in  Poland,
Hungary,  Rumania,  Yugoslavia  and  Bulgaria  in  the late 1940s. Those  State
National  Banks  performed  several  roles: they  had  the  monopoly  of issuing
money,  and  therefore  acted  as Central  Banks,  they  regulated  the  financial
system,  and  provided  short-term  credits  to enterprises  in the  context  of the
11  See Spulber  (1957),  pp. 83.
12  The exception  was  the property  confiscated  to ex-collaborators.  The
compensation,  when  occurred,  to  foreigners  were  in  general  made  on  a  ad-hoc  basis
and tied  to trade  negotiations  and other  deals.22
planning  system. In turn,  Savings  and  Investment  Banks (very  often  just
branches  of the  State  National  Bank),  received  savings  from  the  population  and
channeled  them  as financing  for  investment.
The  monetary  history  of the  region  after  World  War IS resembled  in
several  ways that  of the  post  world  war I  peri.od.  After  world  war II the
financing  of the  war by  printing  money (along  with rationing)  left  a  money
overhang.  Moreover  after  1945.  the  effort  of teconstruction  and the  need to
recapitalize  and  expand  the  nationalized  sector  led  to a  rapid  expansion  of
money supply  in several  East-Central  European  economies  (see  Table  12).
Table  12  Currency  in Circulation  in  Czechoslovakia.  Poland  and
Yuaoslavia.  1945-1947
Czechoslovakia  Poland  Yugoslavia
1938  100  100  100
1945  254  1,878  231
1948  908  12,400  509
Source:  Spulber  (1957)
From another  angle  the  accumulation  of excessive  liquidity  originated
from  an excessive  increase  in the  wage bill relative  to the  output  of consumer
goods  at fixed  prices  ("too  high  wages"  chasing  for  "too  few  goods"). The
resulting  shortages  in the  consumption  goods  market  led  to an accumulation  of
involuntary  savings  in the  form  of  liquid  assets.23
Table  13  Consumption  Spending  and  Wages,  1948-1951
1948  1949  1950  1951
Czechoslovakia
Consumption  100  108  118  131
Watge  Bill  100  112  142  159
Hungary
Consumption  100  122  134  152
Wage Bill  100  131  169  206
Poland
Consumption  100  101  118  126
Wage Bill  100  143  180  256
Rumania
Consumption  100  90  109  111
Wage Bill  100  154  210  N.A
Source: Ames,  E. (1954).
As the  accumulation  of excessive  liquidity  threatened  to become  an
inflationary  factor,  governments  implemented  monet:ary  reforms  to soak-up
lavish  monetary  balances. The  monetary  reforms  comprised  at least  one  of the
following  measures: (1)  the reduction  in the  supply  of liquid  assets  through
the  compulsory  exchange  of "old"  money  into  "new"  money  at a given  rate  of
conversion;  (2)  the  immobilization  of a fraction  of the  supply  of liquid
assets  in the  form  of blocked  deposits  in the  banking  system. The  blocked
funds  were put in special  accounts  and  individuals  were able  to spend  just  on
the  unblocked  part of their  deposits,  (though  they  were still  owners  of the
full  deposits);  (3)  the  conversion  of  wages to a  new  unit,  at a given  rate  of
axchange.
In several  countries  of the  region,  the  monetary  reforms  involved
differentiated  rates  of conversions  for  bank  notes  vis-a-vis  bank  deposits,
with a  more favorable  rate  of converelon  for  deposits  (this  intended  to tax
speculators  who often  operated  with currency). In addition,  a distinction  was
made according  to the  amount  of liquid  assets  held  by individuals  and24
enterprises,  favoring  small  holders  against  large  ones  or private
enterprises.  13
The  actual  rates  of conversions  of money  varied  from  country  to country:
in the  Hungarian  monetary  reform  of  December  1945  the  rate  of conversion  was  4
to 1 for  bank notes.  In Bulgaria,  the  rate  of conversion  was 100  to 1  in the
reform  of March,  1947.  In  Rumania,  the  rates  of conversion  varied  from 100  to
1, to 400  to 1 in the  monetary  reform  of January  1952.  Blocking  of bank
deposits  took  place  in Poland  in December  1944,  in  Czechoslovakia  in October
1945, in Bulgaria in March 1947.'4
The  extent  to  which  monetary  reforms  were successful  in reducing  excess
liquidity  and inflationary  pressures  in Eastern  Europe  may  be debatable  as, in
general,  the  rate of conversion  for  wages  were  more favorable  than  for
money" 5. Moreover,  the  task  of reducing  excess  liquidity  was not  an easy one
as  several  countries of the region had to implement more than one monetary
reform  in the  period  1945-53.
A (classic)  case  of hyperinflation  in  the  transition  to socialism  is
provided  by Hungary  in 1945-1946. Moreover,  this  was the  second  Hungarian
hyperinflation  after  the  one  of the  early  1920s. This second  hyperinflation
of 1945-1946  was more intense  than  the  former  one in  Hunga':y  and  was  more
extreme  than  the  German  hyperinfletion  of 1923. As in other  historical
episodes  of extreme  inflation,  the  Hungarian  one  of 1945-1946  came  associated
with a severe  increase  of the  fiscal  deficit. As Table  14 shows,  during  most
of the  hyperinflation,  tax  revenues  financed  less  than 10  percent  of fiscal
expenditures.  An important  element  in the  deterioration  of fiscal  finances
was the  burden  imposed  by the  reparations  payments  agreed  by Hungary  in the
3  See Gurley (1953)  for an interesting  discussion  and documentation  of
monetary  reforms  in  Western  and  Eastern  Europe. A more  recent  analysis  of the
topic  is  Dornbusch  and  Wolf (1990).
4  Blocking  of bank deposits  also were part of the monetary  reforms  in
Western  Europe  after  World  War  II. Examples  are  Belgium  in  October  1944,  France,
June 1945,  and  January  1948;  Austria,  Denmark,  Norway  and  Netherlands  in 1945;
see  Gurley  (1953).
"  See Ames (1954).25
armistice  of January  1945. That reparations  were to be paid  mainly  to the
Soviet  Union,  and  also to  Czechoslovakia  and  Yugoslavia 16. Reparations  and
occupation  costs  represented  between  25-50  percent  of public  spending" 7. The
financing  of the fiscal  deficit  x  as  done  through  treasury  bills  issued  by the
Hungarian  government  and  discounted  by the  Central  Bank.  In addition,  one  of
the features  that is considered  as crucial  in  the  making  of an astronomical
inflation  in Hungary  was  the  indexation  of the  money supply.
Table 14  Public  Finances  in Hungary.  1945-1946
Prcentae  aof  Occupation  and  reRaration
fiscal  exen  itures  costs  as  Rercentafe  of fiscal
financed  by fiscal  revenues  expenditure
1945
July  6.8  23.0
August  5.3  34.0
September  7.3  23.0
October  5.7  24.0
November  6.6  31.0
December  7.1  40.0
1946
January  14.2  26.0
February  14.4  32.0
March  13.0  39.0
April  9.8  50.0
May  7.3  38.0
Source:  Bomberger  and  Makinen  (1983).
16  The reparation  payments  were calculated  in  US$  300  million  and  they  had
to be paid in a period  of 6 years.  The  national  income  of Hungary  in 1945-1946
is estimated  in around  1  billion  dollars;  see  Bomberger  and  Makinen  (1983).
1  The  worsening  of  the  fiscal  situation  in  Hungary  also  came  from  the  side
of reduced  tax revenues  due  to the  administrative  mismanagement  after  the  war,
the  destruction  of records  or.  income  and  assets  during  the  war,  the  fall  in the
level  of economic  activity  and  the  acceleration  in inflation,  see  Bomberger  and
Makinen  (1983).26
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The Hungarian  stabilization  plan of August  1, 1946  - designed  by the
marxist  economist  Eugene  Varga  and  backed  by the  communist  party  - consisted
of the following  measures:  (1)  Monetary  reform. A new  unit  was introduced,
the  forint  and,  initially,  a 100  percent  reserve  requirement  was imposed on
commercial  banks.  The  central  bank  was forbidden,  by law,  to make direct  or
indirect  loans  to the  goverment.  The practice  of discounting  treasury  bills
was abolished,  and  the  only  operations  allowed  between  the treasury  and  the
central  bank  were loans  to finance  the  acquisition  of gold  or foreign
currencies; (2)  Fiscal  Reform. The tax  system  was completely  revamped,
raising  the  tax  rates  on labor  income  and  property  as  well as the  sales  tax.
A turnover  tax on enterprisds  was introduced  and  fiscal  expenditures  were
reduced  by cutting  the  number  of civil  servants  and  reducing  the size  of the
army and  police;  (3)  External  financing. The plan  had  external  support  in
the  form  of tied  U.S. loans,  increased  food  supplies  granted  by the  U.N. and
an extended  payment  period  to the  Soviet  Union  over  that  initially agreed  in
the  armistice  of 1945.
The plan succeeded  and  hyperinflation  rapidly  stopped. From  August  1st
to December  1946,  inflation  rose  by 6  percent. The rate  of inflation  in 1947
was approximately  19  percent. Stabilization  came  along  with rapid
monetization  (the  increase  in  money  demand  following  the  stabilization  was27
accommodated)  and the  money  stock  increased  by 221  percent  between  August  31,
1946  and  December  31,  1946. During  1947,  the  nominal  money  stock  grew  by 132
percent.  "'
The effects  of stabilization  on output  and  employment  are  hard to
determine  given  the  sketchy  data available  though  a reduction  in employment
along  with an increase  in national  product  seemed  to  have taken  place  during
1946-1947. The aftermath  of the  stabilization  was dominated  in the  political
stage  by the  communist  coup d'etat  of June  of 1947  forcing  the  resignation  of
prime  minister  Nagy.  As a result  of the  coup,  the  communist  party  took over
practically  all  of the  ministries  in the  government  and  the state  was
reorganized  in a  way instrumental  to the  establishment  of socialism. On the
economic  sphere,  the  nationalization  process  and  the  imposition  of central
planning  was definitely  accelerated.
3.  The  Collapse  of Socialism  in  East-Central  EuroRe:  thQ  Late 1980s
The  seemingly  irreversible  socialist  experiment  in  East-Central  Europe
came  to sudden,  and  largely  unexpected,  end  towards  the late  1980.. The
collapse  of Soviet-style  socialism  has  both  economic  and  political  roots.
Central  planning  led  to endemic  shortages,  slow  technical  change,  low-quality
goods  and  overexpanded  public  sectors.  In practice,  full  employment  and  social
protection  was bought  at the  price  of economic  backwardness  and lack  of
political  freedom.  Attempts  of  partial  reform  in the 1980s  often  worsened
macroeconomic  conditions  as credit  and  wage policies  were relaxed  and  fiscal
budgets  turned  into  deficits. In addition,  several  Eastern  European  economies
borrowed  heavily  abroad  accumulating  large  external  debt  that  further
complicated  domestic  economic  management.
At the  political  level,  more than  four  decades  of ore-party  rule and
authoritarianism  generated  (non-official)  domestic  consensus  on the  need  for
political  opening  and  democracy. In 1989,  the  authoritarian  regimes  dominated
by the  communist  party (or  its  equivalent)  were toppled  by emerging  political
18 See  Bomberger  and  Makinen (1983).28
parties  and social  movements  with an  agenda  of  political  transition  to a
western-style  democracy  and the  creation  of a  market  economy.
Let  us present  some  data to  have  a broad  picture  of  both  the final  state
of the socialist  experiment  and the initial  conditions  in the transition
towards  the  market  economy.
Table 16  Inflation  and GDP growth  in  selected  East-Central  European
Countries.  1986-1990  (percentages)
Poland  YuRoslavia  Hungarv  Czechoslovakia  Bulgaria
GDP  Infl.  GDP  Infl.  GDP  Infl.  NMP'  Infl.  GDP  Infl.
growth  rate*  growth  rate  growth  rate  growth  rate  growth  rate
198S  1.5  18.0  3.4  89.8  1.5  5.3  2.6  0.50  4.2  1.3
1987  3.4  25.2  -0.5  120.8  3.4  8.6  2.1  0.09  6.1  0.07
1988  0.1  60.0  -1.0  194.1  0.1  15.7  2.3  0.09  2.6  2.3
1989  -1.0  700.0  -2.0  2,700.0  0.5  1  9.6  1.9  1.44  -1.9  4.4
1990  -10.0  58.0  -5.0  70 .5b  -2.2  -10.0
Source:  The  World  Bank.
*:  The  inflation  rate  for  every  country  corresponds  to  the  Consumer  Price
Index.s:Net  Material  Product.  £:January-August.1990.b:  January-October,  1990.
The image  emerging  from  Table  16  is  that  of  deteriorated  economic
conditions  and is reflected  (among  other  indicators)  in  lower  growth  and
higher  inflation  in the  second  half  of the  1980s. Macro instability  was  more
acute  in  Yugoslavia  and Poland  where (near)  hyperinflation  developed  in 1989.
To eradicate  (high)  inflation  and create  a more  favorable  macro  environment
for  a  market-oriented  economy,  both  countries  adopted  sharp  anti-inflationary
policies  in  early 1990. Those  plans  included  a large  real  depreciation  of the
exchange  rate,  the  deregulation  of  most of  controlled  prices,  a tight  monetary
and  credit  policies,  the correction  of fiscal  deficits  and  a drastic  lowering29
in imports  tariffs9'.  In addition,  an initial  attempt  of privatization  of
state-owned  enterprises  is  being  carried-out  in  both countries  with still
limited  success.
Hungary  and  Czechoslovakia  are  in better  shape,  though  current  inflation
in  Hungary  is considered  relatively  high.  Czechoslovakia,  following  a long
history  of  macro  stability  and  prudence  (that  comes  back from  its  pre-
socialist  period)  has  not experienced  any  open inflationary  upsurge  until  now,
though  some  acceleration  in inflation  can  not  be discarded  for  the  future.
Economic  decline  in  Bulgaria  is  quite  dramatic:  output  growth  was  negative  in
1989  and  an  additional  drop in GDP  by near 101  in  1990  is  expected.  Any
recovery  in real  economic  activity  will  be slow  as the  country  --  heavily
dependent  in its  foreign  trade  with the  U.S.S.R.  --  is expecting  a large
deterioration  in its  terms  of trade  associated  with the  collapse  of  Comecon.
Inflation  is also  a potentially  serious  problem  there  as the fiscal  deficit
deteriorated  and a  large  money  overhang  accumulated  in the  previous  years. 20
The economic  outlook  for  Eastern  Europe  is  bleak. Negative  growth  in 1990  is
a sheer  witness  of the  collapse  of the  ancient  economic  system. The  current
situation  does  not leave  much room  for  optimism  given  the  monumental  task  of
transforming  a  very obsolete  economic  system  into  a dynamic  one.  Currently,
the  problems  of structural  transformation  are  compounded  by the  disintegration
of Comecon  (it  will entail  a big  terms  of trade  deterioration  for  Eastern
Europe  via a vis the  Soviet  Union),  and the  reluctance  of international
capital  markets  to commit  ample  credit  to the  region  until  the  process  of
reform  gets  more consolidated.
19  For  a  description  of  the  stabilization  policies  in  Poland,  see  Lipton  and
Sachs  (1990a).  A comparative  analysis  of the  Polish  and  Yugoslav  stabilization
plans  is  Coricelli  and  Rocha  (1990).  For  an  analysis  of  privatization  in  Eastern
Europe  see  Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990b).
20  See  Solimano  (1990c)  for  an analysis  of the  Bulgarian  case.30
Table  17  Structure  of GDP in selected  East-Central  Burogean
Co,utrie-.19880
(percentages)
Agriculture  Industry  Construction  Total
and  Services
Czechoslovakia  6.4  59.6  34.0  100.0
Hungary  14.0  37.0  49.0  100.0
Poland
Yugoslavia  14.0  49.0  37.0  100.0
Bulgariae  12.6  58.5  28.9  100.0
Source:  The  World  Bank.
:  the  shares  for  Czechoslovakia  and  Bulgaria  correspond  to NMP.b:  the
shares  correspond  to 1989.
Looking  at the  structure  of production  in  East-Central  Europe  in the
late  1980.  it is noticeable  the  reduced  share  of agriculture  in output  and the
relatively  high share  of industry  in output  (between  50 to 60  percent). 21
Socialist  industrialization  significantly  altered  the  production  structure  of
the 1930s  (table  10). While  Bulgaria,  Yugoslavia  and  Rumania  were
predominantly  agrarian  economies  with a share  of agriculture  on national
income  of over  55 percent  in 1938,  in  the late  1980s  that  share  got reduced  to
less  than 15  percent. However,  as  we shall  see  below,  socialist
industrialization  did  not  bring  much prosperity;  for illustration  purposes
take  the case  of Spain.  a backward  Western  European  country  in the  thirties,
that  industrialized  in  the 1950s  and  1960s  around  (protected)  market  lines,
ended  up  with a level  uf per  capita  GDP (1988)  of around  three  times  higher
than the  average  GDP per capita  of East-Central  Europe  in the  same  year (see
Table  19).  Socialist  industrialization  had  an initial  "easy  phase"  as it
pulled  idle  resources  from  the  agricultural  sector;  however  it turned very
capital  intensive  and focused  heavily  in the  development  of the  capital  goods
21  This number  tends to be a bit overstated  in Czechoslovakia  where the
ratio  is  with respect  to Net  Material  Product  (that  excludes  several  services
like  education,  health  and  other  "non-productive"  activities).31
sector  in clear  detriment  of the  production  of  manufacturing  consumer  goods
whose quality  was poor
2 2 . In  practice  the  industrialization  process  in
Eastern  Europe  came  along  with a  wall of tariffs  and  prohibitions  of imports
from the  West.  The pattern  of specialization  was  dictated  by the  needs  of
the  Soviet  Union  and  the location  of production  did  not  follow  comparative
advantages  criteria.
Table 18  Size  of  the  State  Sector  in  East-Central  EuroRe
(percentage  of output  and 




East  Germany  96.5  94.2
(1982)
Poland  81.7  71.5
(1985)
Hungary  65.2  69.9
(1984)
The end  of the  centrally  planned  economy  in East-Central  Europe  leaves
as a legacy  an almost  complete  dominance  of the  public  sector  in the
generation  of output. A year  of transition  from  socialism  suggests  that
privatization  is crucial  for  creating  a  market  economy,  though  that  process  is
bound  to face  multiple  obstacles  both  of an  operational  as  well as political
nature.
Finally,  a look  at recent  levels  of per  capita  GDP in several  countries
of East-Central  European  countries  is revealing. Using  World  Bank  estimates
of per capita  GDP in dollars  for 1988,  (Table  19)  it is  clear  that  the
historical  differences  between  Eastern  and  Western  Europe  existing  in the  late
thirties  (Table  9) did  not  narrowed  down  after  40 years  of socialism. Quite
22  See Solimano  (1990b)  for a discussion  of the patterns  of productivity
growth  in socialist  economies.32
on the opposite,  the  data  suggests  (of  course  with the  usual  caveats  involved
in  comparisons  of real  income  over time  and  across  countries)  that  differences
in  per capita  income  have  widened  spectacularly.  For  example  while  in 1937
Czechoslovakia  had a  national  income  per  head just 10  percent  below  of that  of
Austria,  in 1988  the  GDP  per  capita  of Czechoslovakia  was near  one-fifth  of
the  GDP per  head of  Austria  (U$  3,300  for  Czechoslovakia  versus  U$ 15,470  of
Austria). In 1988  the  GDP  per  capita  of one  of the  most developed  countries
in  Western  Europe  (measured  by GDP  per  capita),  say  West Germany was 5.6
times  larger  than  the  GDP  of Czechoslovakia  (the  most developed  country  of
East-Central  Europe). In contrast,  in 1937,  the  national  income  per  head of
Great  Britain  was just  2.6  times  the income  per  head of Czechoslovakia. 23
Currently  the  average  GDP  per  capita  of East-Central  European  countries  are
closer  to the  levels  of output-per  capita  of Latin  American  countries  like
Mexico,  Brazil  and  Argentina.
23  Great Britain  was the country  with the highest  per capita  income  in
Europe  in the 1930s.33
Table  19  ODP per  CaDita  in Selected  East-Central  EuroDean  Economies













Germany,  R.F.  18,480
United  States  19,840
Source:  World  Development  Report.  1990. The  World  Bank.
4.  Concluding  Remarks  and Summary
This  paper  reviews  first  the  main features  of the  economic  history  of
East-Central  Europe  in  the interwar  period,  and  the forties  included  the
establishment  of socialism. Then it looks  at the  initial  conditions  for  the
transition  to a  market  economy  after  the  collapse  of socialism  in  the late
1980s. A summary  of our  main findings  follows:
* The economic  history  of East-Central  Europe  shows  episodes  of extreme
inflation  and exacerbated  macroeconomic  instability  after  World  War I and  the
early 1920.. Examples  of that  were the  hyperinflation  of Poland,  Hungary.
Austria.  Stabilization  of hyperinflation  in Poland,  Hungary  and  other  Central34
European  economies  required  stabilizing  the  exchange  rate,  fisecal  reform,  the
inception  of independent  Central  Banks  and (conditional)  foreign  financing
provided  by the  League  of Nations. The case  of Czechoslovakia,  formed  with
part of the territories  left from  the  Austro-Hungarian  empire  stands  by its
own  as it  managed  to sort  out  the  reconstruction  period  after  World  War I
without  inflation  and  with  macroeconomic  stability.
*  The  second  half of the 1920s  in  East-Central  Europe  was a period  of
relatively  high  growth,  low  inflation,  moderate  protectionism  and  increasing
financial  integration  in the  context  of the  gold  exchange  standard  system.
London  and  New York  were the  main financial  centers  at the time  and  the
British  Pound  and  the  US dollar  the  reserve  currencies  besides  gold.
* The great  depression  of 1929-1933  hit  particularly  hard  Bulgaria,
Rumania  and  Yugoslavia. The  drop in the  international  price  of agricultural
products  was a adverse  foreign  shock  for  these  agrarian  economies. Moreover,
the  disruption  in the  flows  of foreign  financing  also  hit the  Balkans,  Hungary
Poland  and  the  most industrialized  Czechoslovakia.  The response  of the
countries  of East-Central  Europe  to the  adverse  external  shocks  and  the
collapse  of the  gold  exchange  standard  in the  early  1930s  included  the
imposition  of foreign  exchange  controls,  the  rise  in import  duties  and  the
suspension  of debt  payments  abroad.
*  The initial  recovery  of  most economies  in  East-Central  Europe  in the
second  half  of the  1930s  was driven  basically  by Germany. The preparation  for
war in that  country  required  an abundant  supply  of agricultural  products  and
raw  materials  that  could  be provided  by the  Balkans  countries,  and  also  by
Hungary  and  Poland. The large  industrial  base of Czechoslovakia  was also
instrumental  for  the  German  rearmament.  To enhance  foreign  control,  this
country  and  Austria  (the  "Czech-Moravian  Protectorate")  were finally annexed
by Germany  before  the  war.
* Poland  and  Yugoslavia  were the  countries  that suffered  more in terms
of destruction  of productive  capabilities,  destruction  of infrastructure  and
housing  and  human  losses  with the  occupation  and  second  world  war.35
Czechoslovakia  was the  country  that suffered  comparatively  loes  after  the
conflict.
* After 1945  the  nationalization  of industrial  firms,  the financial
system  and  the  launching  of agrarian  reform  were the  main features  of the
economic  policies  implemented  by the  coalition  governments  that  emerged  in
East-Central  Europe  after  the  war.  Besides,  the  drive  toward  full
nationalization  and  the  creation  of a system  of central  planning  fully
consolidated  after  a series  of coup  d'etat  led  by the  communist  parties  in
1948.
* The second  half  of the 1940s  provides  an interesting  laboratory  of
monetary  reform  aimed  to reduce  excess  liquidity  accumulated  during  the  war
and  therea'ter. The  reforms  involved  the  reduction  of the  money supply
through  (differential)  rates  of  exchange  between  "old"  and "new"  money  in
Hungary,  Rumania,  Poland  and  Bulgaria. The  blocking  of deposits  in the
banking  system  took  place in  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  and  Bulgaria  between
1945-1955. Some of these  reforms  were implemented  also in  Western  European
countries  like  France,  Austria,  Belgium  and  others  over the  same  period.
* A neat  case of  hyperinflation  in the  transition  to socialism  was
Hungary  in 1945-1946. Economic  stabilization  in Hungary  was achieved  when
public  finances  were brought  in  balance,  the  currency  stabilized  and  a package
of foreign  financing  and  debt and  war reparations  relief  was put in  place.
* The collapse  of socialism  in  East-Central  Europe  in the late  1980.
made evident  the  structural  weakness  of  central  planning  in improving  the
standards  of living  of the  population.  Economic  hardship  and  closed  political
systems  could  not last  forever.  Systemic  reform  has  come along  with
increased  macroeconomic  stability  in  several  cases. Hyperinflation  was
rampant  in Poland  and  Yugoslavia  in 1989.  In addition,  public  finances  and  the
balance  of  payments  deteriorated  in  most countries  of the  region. Economic
transformation  looms  as a  long  and  complicated  process  as the initial
conditions  for  the  transition  to a  market  economy  are  very  weak.  In fact,
these  economies  are  characterized  by  obsolete  and  uncompetitive  productive36
capacities,  macroeconomic  imbalances,  lack  of modern  infrastructure  and factor
markets  and  weak institutions  besides  other  factors. In addition,  the
external  environment  in the  east  is  not  very supportive:  the  disintegration  of
the  Comecon  will entail  large  terms  of trade  losses  for  Eastern  Europe  via a
vis the  Soviet  Union  and  a  massive  influx  of western  capital  is  unlikely  to be
observed  in the short  to  medium  run.  On the  political  side,  the initial
euphoria  associated  with the  end  of the  old regime  is being  replaced  by a less
enthusiastic  public  attitude  towards  the  hardships  of the  transition.  Fragile
and changing  political  coalitions  and  the  temptation  of populism  clearly
reflect  that  tendencies.
* Finally,  an important  finding  of the  paper  is that  the  differences  in
per-capita  income  between  Eastern  and  Western  Europe  have  widened  after
snciallU-. In 1937,  before  second-world  war and socialism,  the  ratio  of
incs',  per  head of the  highest  income  per  capita  in  Western  Europe  at the  time
(Great  Brit-in)  to the  highest  income  per  head  in East-Central  Europe
(Czechoslovakia)  was 2.6 times. In 1988,  the  ratio  of per  capita  income  of
West  Germany  (now  with higher  per capita  income  than  Great  Britain)  over  the
GDP  per  head of Czechoslovakia  is  5.6 times. The average  income  per  capita  of
Eastern  Europe  is nowadays  closer  to the  level  of per  capita  income  of Latin
American  countries  like  Mexico,  Brazil  and  Argentina.37
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